Sep 172011
 

Here is the final version of my Master’s thesis, as approved by my committee and filed at SF State.

Abstract
In this thesis, I argue that stereotypes against singles can be understood as belief packages, which combine mental states that influence our behavior in powerful ways. Much of this influence remains nonconscious reflecting the neurological imprinting from being exposed to stereotypical messages. Because stereotypes have internalized and external components, any approach for overcoming them needs to address both aspects. I suggest that we can overcome internalized stereotypes by recognizing them as shame. Through an ethics of care we can transform shame by offering empathy. To prepare for a democracy grounded in an ethics of care, we need to learn how to make it a way of life. We cannot do that in the institution that currently prepares us, the nuclear family, since it is marred by stereotypes against singles that it reinforces. Instead we need to design intentional families that help us overcome the external aspects of these stereotypes.

The Whole Thing is here.

Jul 132011
 

Using pragmatist models of democracy as a two-strand entity that has to become part of our daily lives to fully function, i outline how we can design families to support the participatory strand. Following Dewey’s suggestion to evaluate “inherited institutions,” i examine the nuclear family’s implication for democratic living. There are several ways in which the nuclear family prevents deepening democracy: It reinforces hierarchy and biological bonds, prevents exposure to difference, and enables an attitude of devaluing friendship. Most importantly, it does not teach children how to seek out difference and make democracy a way of life. Dewey asks philosophers to go beyond evaluation. He calls upon us to develop experiments that can be implemented to replace existing institutions with new ones that are more in alignment with our ultimate vision. Thus, i present a potential experiment: An intentional community that is designed to be training ground for deep democracy for both children and adults. This community builds on ideas advanced by Iris Marion Young and Erin McKenna. I incorporate my own experience at Hayes Valley Farm to advance a way to safeguard diversity, which addresses some of the dangers Young and McKenna seem to assume away, particularly our human tendency to move from diversity toward homogenized groups.

The full paper is here.

May 312011
 

I can’t remember exactly how i stumbled on the topic of shame but once i did, i quickly realized that stereotypes have a lot to do with shame. One of the most prevalent shaming messages is the idea that we are not good enough. And if a stereotype sets up a norm – such as that of a white, heterosexual, married man – anybody who doesn’t fall into any of those categories is “not good enough.” Stereotypes are shaming. In this paper, i explore this further from a philosophical perspective with some psychology thrown in. The full paper is here. Please use the comment section below to add your ideas, questions, and suggestions.

Introduction:
In this paper, i argue that most philosophical accounts miss an important dimension of shame: The power dimension. This dimension becomes obvious when we look at the descent of shame: Shame evolved from submission signals (Maibom 2010). Building on Heidi Maibom’s evolutionary account and drawing on the psychological mechanisms to resolve cognitive dissonance and internalize stereotypes, i present a picture of shame that explains why there are social status differentials in the ability to shame (572). Ultimately, i present an ethics of care approach that allows us to counteract stereotypes. This approach does not rely on shame since i argue that shame is not a useful moral emotion because of its problematic tie to the status quo.
The claim that shame is not helpful must sound audacious in light of the prevalence of philosophical writing that argues shame can be useful as a moral emotion (see, e.g., Van Norden 2007). I will not argue against these viewpoints. Rather, i assert that shame is not useful with a certain end-in-view in mind: A democracy that is incorporated into our daily lives (McKenna 2001). This two-strand democracy is more consistent with an ethics of care, which dissolves hierarchies and stresses connections between humans (Green 2008). The empirical evidence i review suggests that shame is a powerful emotion that too easily has negative consequences, including ethical, making it a “moral dead end” (Noddings 2010, 140). This becomes particularly obvious when we look at the impact of internalized stereotypes. Although not all shame might stem from stereotypes, stereotype-induced shame allows us to see the power dimension most clearly. Together with stereotypes, the evolutionary account of shame provided by Maibom suggests that shame plays an important role in upholding social hierarchies.

Jan 132011
 

Studying stereotype development led me to the idea that we could design our communities in ways that can help us create a more just world. To do that, we need tools that specifically address aspects of justice. In this paper, i used Iris Marion Young’s work to both develop a conception of justice and suggest ways we might be able to reach that ideal. The resulting paper is available here. Please use the comment section below to add your ideas, questions, and suggestions.

Abstract:
How can we attain a more just world? I present an approach that integrates changes at the institutional, collective, and personal levels based on a feminist vision corresponding to Iris Marion Young’s ideal of justice. Young (1990; 1989) extends the traditional distributional justice paradigm through a central idea: People are in relation to each other. These interrelationships also form the foundation of her theory of global justice (2006). I incorporate these facets into a picture of social justice that allows us to evaluate local and global contexts. I identify four elements that ensure social justice. Culled from the work of several philosophers, I include tools that can help us incorporate these elements into our communities – at the institutional and collective levels – to reach Young’s ideal thus counteracting our current unjust realities, which I sketch briefly. Transformation happens only if we combine the elements synthesized from philosophers’ work, which address systemic changes, with their application in our personal lives. There is evidence that the status quo is deeply embedded in our social selves often manifested through stereotypes. While reshaping interactions seems to imply changes on the personal level, none of the philosophers call for them outright. Thus, I outline some ways of applying the philosophical tools presented to our lives to achieve individual transformation.

Many political philosophers envision a more just society. They are often criticized for failing to provide a roadmap of how to get from our current reality to their envisioned future (Young 1995). Richard Wasserstrom (1977) suggests arguments for change in society require three perspectives: Current social realities, a normative vision, and means for achieving this vision. I follow his approach in this paper to allow us to get from “here to there” (Young 1995, 234).

Jan 132011
 

Grappling with finding ways to counteract stereotype development, i decided to take a permaculture design course. Permaculture suggests that we can design our communities to ensure sustainability but do these designs address issues of justice? That was the question i pursued in a paper that resulted from independent reading to accompany the PDC. You can find that paper here. And please feel free to leave comments or suggestions!

Abstract:
This paper critically examines the permaculture approach to community and ethics leveraging feminist and environmental justice analyses. Permaculture originated as a systems design to regenerative agriculture but quickly expanded to encompass human settlements and interactions. The two originators of permaculture – Bill Mollison and David Holmgren – have both offered their visions of new ways of organizing our lives that are in harmony with nature and repair at least some of the damage done by humans. After summarizing the theoretical framework advanced by Mollison and Holmgren, I draw on feminist analyses by Nancy Frazer, Nicola Lacey, and Iris Marion Young to critique their visions, including tendencies to universalize and calls to reinstate gendered spheres. Additionally, I utilize David Schlosberg’s review of environmental and ecological justice, demonstrating that permaculture is largely anthropocentric in its approach to the protection of nature. Overall, I argue that permaculture does not actively address issues of justice – neither in theory nor in the applied movement. There do not seem to be any safeguards that are informed by the theoretical work of feminists and environmental ethicists.
This paper is written with much admiration of and appreciation for the people practicing permaculture. They are doing wonderful things to heal the earth and our communities – growing solutions where theorists mostly offer critiques. Yet, this respect is tied to concerns that too much faith in the process prevents directly addressing issues raised by theorists of justice. The assumption seems to be that if we want the right thing, everything will work out just fine once implemented. Thus, I finish by outlining potential safeguards that would let the movement develop as it counteracts unjust tendencies of the prevailing culture.

Jan 132011
 

This was my very first graduate philosophy paper! I wrote it for a philosophy of mind class to better understand how cultural institutions like marriage can become lodged into our cultures despite problems with them. As i was researching the topic, i felt the need to conceptualize stereotype development. This is the result.

I presented the paper at the 2010 Pacific SWIP conference and substantially revised it after receiving some valuable feedback. You can find the latest version of the paper here. Feel free to leave comments and/or suggestions!

Abstract:
Marriage is an almost universal institution. In the US, 90% of the population has been married at some point in their lives (U.S. Census Bureau 2009). Universal institutions are not often questioned since universality is assumed to reflect a social benefit (Wasserstrom 1977). In the case of marriage, this assumption has been called into doubt by some scholars, yet the institution remains strong. The political critiques do not gain ground because they do not address deeply held beliefs. To understand why marriage remains such a strongly valued institution, we need to look beyond a political critique to the cognitive underpinnings. Social change depends on transforming ingrained attitudes that uphold social institutions. In this paper, I argue that changing institutions with undesirable social consequences, such as marriage, requires changing the underlying belief packages, which combine conceptual and nonconceptual content and explain the research from psychology better than any single notion of a belief-like mental state. They also help us clarify why institutional change is so difficult from a cognitive science perspective in addition to the political perspective. If we want to lessen the importance of social institutions, we need to work on the political as well as the cognitive level.